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I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of this Colloquium in Perugia brings to mind the early
twentieth-century debate over the existence of a Latin American international
law. It recalls, in particular, the work of Alejandro Alvarez, the Chilean jurist
and judge on the International Court of Justice. Throughout his life, Alvarez
strove to demonstrate the existence of a regional, American international law.
While it included the United States, its principal sources were Latin American
treaties, conferences, diplomatic history, and the actual practices of states.
Alvarez had many opponents quick to underscore the paradox of a
purportedly particular, yet equally universal, international law. In the end, the
notion of a separate American international law was not widely accepted as
accurate description or worthy aspiration.
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Still, for our purposes here, examining Alvarez’s work more closely
reveals the purposefully constructed nature of his American law. The legal
materials that he marshaled to compose this corpus were: the practices of
Latin American states, the principles commonly defended against European
interference, and a series of treaties and treaty attempts aiming to consolidate
these various norms. For the most part, these consisted of nothing other than
heightened versions of general principles of international law and customary
practices not uncommon among lesser European powers, although not
uniformly recognized as international law. The content of American
international law was, in fact, not very exotic. It was just another variety of
prescriptive understandings arranged in a particular way.
Instead of a claim of real uniqueness or originality in law, this traditionbuilding attempt is better understood in relation to its geo-politics. Alvarez’s
project was a product of its time. It was a moment in which Latin American
states were relatively subordinate in the international arena, not consistently
invited to international congresses, infrequent participants in the creation of
international law, and subject to periods of European and U.S. intervention in
the region. At the time that Alvarez launched his concept, the U.S. occupied
Cuba and Puerto Rico, had engineered Panama’s independence from
Colombia, and controlled the Dominican Republic.
The argument for a regional international law interceded in this
realpolitik. It advocated the notion of hemispheric relations ordered through
law. It placed Latin American states as authors of these international norms,
and it included the United States within its realm. Alvarez’s jurisprudence can
be seen as a strategic geopolitical move to improve the standing and stature of
the Latin American states within the international community. The joint
authorship of an American international law by both Latin American states
and the United States was one dimension. Equally, his work targeted the
United States and its hegemonic role within the hemisphere. Beyond simply
listing a set of common norms, Alvarez urged pan-American collaboration in
the enforcement of international law within the hemisphere, as opposed to
lone U.S. unilateralism. It was a bid against gunboat diplomacy. Specifically, he
advanced the participation of “better constituted” Latin American states in
matters of enforcement. Chile, Argentina, and Brazil could all be reliable
partners, in his view, in enforcing international law in the Americas,
foreclosing European intervention.
Somewhat analogously, the topic of this colloquium invites us to reflect
on the construction of legal traditions. The backdrop here is certainly the
notion of a European legal tradition in the context of the European Union.
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My remarks here are rather by way of comparison with a different context of
legal tradition-building. My focus is on the contemporary formation of a
“Latin American law.” Interestingly, it updates the story of Alvarez and his
attempts to build and convince others of the specificity of an American and
Latin American law. As my account of Alvarez already notes, his was a
historical project of empowerment within the realm of international relations.
It also was an attempt to temper raw U.S. power and unilateral intervention in
the region.
The historiography of a Latin American legal tradition over the past fifty
years, however, has taken a very different turn. Notably, the notions of “Latin
America” and “Latin American Law” have once again been mobilized in the
legal field. This time, it is not as a source of creativity, difference, and standing
– as it was for Alvarez. Rather, it is the foil against which legal reforms and
institutional replacements, are argued, should take place. Indeed, the Latin
American tradition of law – under this newer construction -- is forcefully
depicted as one of lawlessness, legal formalism, an unbridgeable gap between
law and society, legal ineffectiveness, law’s inefficiency, and official
corruption. The most damning evidence against it is economic underdevelopment and political instability. Thus, instead of a fertile source of
experience and experimentation in social organization, the legal tradition
described is one of failure. This pronouncement is underwritten in a variety of
ways. Indeed, it turns out to be the operative conclusion of law-anddevelopment writing and much inter-disciplinary literature on law in the
region.
Accordingly, within the context of legal development assistance in the
past half-century, a core understanding is that Latin America’s law, and by
extension the legal tradition, is significantly responsible for the lack of
progress. The stock of analyses, diagnoses, inter-disciplinary studies,
comparative and historical work, commentaries and the like constitute the
foundations of this “tradition” of law. The latter’s main characteristic –
within this literature -- is its consistent failure to deliver prosperity and
democracy.
As a problem of law, this characterization then paves the way for any
number and type of development prescriptions. Whether overt or implicit,
this underlying narrative in project proposals and country reports establishes
the basis for law reform, institutional re-design, and legal policy change. The
features highlighted as constant failings characteristic of law in Latin America
are, however, predominantly intrinsic contradictions and limitations of all
modern systems of liberal law. Development reforms, by contrast, are
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championed as the rule of law, best practices, rules with better legal origins,
and the like. Yet, they are simply different versions and combinations of
modern legal forms advancing certain policies and priorities. As a result, many
of the intractable legal failings diagnosed in Latin America and associated with
pre-reform law can only but persist even after waves of development reform.
The real change is in the different distributional consequences, legal policies,
institutional priorities, assignments of official discretion, and the like
introduced by the legal structures implemented as development reform.
This Essay describes, in very abridged terms, the instrumental
construction of this particular tradition or identity of law in Latin America. As
a back formation of law and development, it provides the permanent
backdrop and rationale for legal change. Furthermore, this Essay sounds a
cautionary note on the obfuscating role that identity constructions may
produce in contexts of legal and policy reform.
II. LEGAL TRANSNATIONALISM
The legal communities in Latin American states have, historically,
constructed their national legal discourse in deeply transnational ways. Indeed,
the common observation that Latin America is part of the civil law tradition,
or a member of the Romano-Germanic legal family, is primarily an outward
sign of the embeddedness of this transnationalism within the region’s national
legal systems. This paradigm of “European” transnationalism, specifically,
can be analyzed in its different historical moments and from its different
theoretical underpinnings (such as natural law, positivism and legal sociology).
At its most basic, European transnationalism offers a basis for taking
positions on questions of legal interpretation. It provides arguments and
models for law reform and institutional change. And, it legitimates action and
discretion by local legal officials. Law, viewed in this way, is not simply the
winning side of local political struggle or conflicting beliefs. Rather, it can be
portrayed as more broadly transnational – if not plausibly universal.
Additionally, this European transnationalism in Latin America has not
meant the complete exclusion of transnational engagement with U.S. legal
culture. In the area of constitutional law, to take an example, U.S. legal
sources -- if often through the intermediation of European authors -- have
been particularly salient. European legal transnationalism as practiced in Latin
America, however, is not the object of my remarks here, except to note its
salience in the region and its predominantly continental European connection.
The focus here, instead, is on an analogous -- yet different -- transnational
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paradigm more recently prominent within the region: law and development
or, as I refer to it here, “development” transnationalism. This second
paradigm, as well, can be analyzed as a distinct phenomenon with its own
periods and theoretical bases.
III. DEVELOPMENT TRANSNATIONALISM
The past fifty years have seen a significant rise in exchange between the
United States and Latin American states in the legal sphere. Chiefly, this is due
to the funding initiatives of the U.S. government, U.S.-based foundations and
U.S.-influenced international organizations. These efforts have generally been
grouped together and described as the law and development movement. The
topic has been extensively written about. Commentators note its different
phases, changing political orientation, and general theoretical presuppositions.
For the most part, however, the phenomenon has been addressed primarily
from the supply side of the equation. The focus has been on the types of
projects funded, their political economy, and the objectives of funding
organizations. Scholars have also expounded on the mostly tacit legal theories
underlying these efforts: primarily an uncritical faith in the effectiveness of the
U.S. legal system and its positive co-relation with economic growth. At the
same time, others have noted the imperious and imperial nature of these
assumptions and designs. Additionally, attention has been directed to the
actual beneficiaries of these projects, both governments in power and specific
individuals who may benefit from the resources and clout they offer.
In terms of funded projects, three different periods are generally noted:
the original 1960-70’s developmental state round, the 1990’s neo-liberal
round, and the more recent social justice moment. I briefly describe the main
two periods here and leave for another time fuller discussion of the more
contemporary third period. In the 1960-70’s, the funding organizations were
either the U.S. government or U.S. based foundations, specifically the United
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) and the Ford
Foundation. The objective in this first round was state-led growth, planning
and control by regulatory agencies, government reallocation of resources, and
the like. It was supported by Keynesian economics placing the state as the
principal agent of development. The objective in the legal sphere was a
pragmatic state regulatory law, capable of effectively implementing
government planning and transcending vested private rights with the potential
to impede government action. Outwardly, legal development assistance was
introduced as part of state modernization. Early projects emphasized
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improving legal education and consequently the legal culture.
Developmentalists believed the right prescription was American-style legal
realism and policy-oriented lawyering. In fact, in the first period, the main
focus was to transform Latin American law schools along U.S. lines.
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s neo-liberal round, more international
organizations became involved, many of them following the lead of U.S. or
U.S. controlled entities. Among them were Inter-American Development
Bank, World Bank, along with early donors like Ford Foundation and
USAID. Additionally, European Union and European national agencies have
also more recently participated in projects of this type, less in Latin America
than in Africa and the Maghreb. This second period was dominated by neoclassical economics with its focus on free markets, privatization and deregulation. Accordingly, the principal objectives for law were the protection of
private property, enforcement of contracts, regulation of securities markets,
and enforcement of criminal law.
The first two periods of law and development funding had very different
economic theories driving them. The third more contemporary moment, now
described by scholars, arises from the backlash against orthodox neoliberalism. The response on the part of donors has been to incorporate more
social justice and minority rights concerns within their project funding
priorities. Whether or not this change is significant or alters any of the main
underlying propositions of neo-liberal developmentalism remains to be seen.
An alternative way of conceptualizing law and development, however, is
as a separate paradigm of transnationalism. Structurally, the projects fit the
logic of foreign assistance by developed to lesser developed countries: Donors
sponsor legal change in countries lacking developed law. More broadly,
though, law and development provides an alternative logic for reasoning
about the law. It can be usefully compared to the European legal
transnationalism, strongly rooted in Latin America. It can propel very
differently oriented projects on its account. It can draw on various legal
theories for justification. It no doubt redounds to the benefit of governments
and individuals capable of mobilizing its resources. And, it appeals to the
promise of prosperity and democracy – economic and political development - through better versions of law or the “rule of law,” tout court. The many
conflicting political aspirations of societal actors all appear equally attainable
simply through the right mix of positive law, public institutions, and legal
culture. In this way, development transnationalism offers a legal terrain in
which to work out the problems of poor economies, human rights violations,
deficient democracy, and the like.
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Thus, as an epistemic construct, development transnationalism provides
a rationale for a wide range of legal change at the level of positive law, legal
institutions, legal culture, etc. It orients this activity under the rubric of
promoting development, and it provides significant legitimacy by the weight
of foreign and local experts, international organizations, and scholarly
consensus. Additionally, in Latin America, transnationalism, as already noted,
is an historically accepted and privileged driver of legal change. The deepseatedness of European transnationalism as a mode of legal reasoning and
legitimation paves the way for yet different modes of transnationalism.
IV. THE LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION
Salient within the paradigm of development transnationalism – in all its
phases -- is the counterpoint image of the poor quality of legal systems in
Latin America. Notably, though, in many Latin American countries, law and
legal institutions are well developed elements of national social systems.
Observers have noted that Latin American states are not lacking in law, in fact
there may be too much of it. There are abundant law schools and law
graduates. Political leaders and government officials often have legal training.
Moreover, law and legal discourse from Europe and the United States have
been primary tools of governance, over these countries’ nearly 200 years of
independence.
As such, law and development’s main tenet that law is central to
prosperity and democracy would seem to call for a better explanation in Latin
America. There the legal systems have ostensibly failed to deliver.
Presumptively, a diagnosis pointing to the absence of Western conceptions of
liberal law is not plausible. As noted above, Latin American societies are
steeped in Western law, and legal institutions pervade much of society. Rather,
the general diagnosis is directed at the kind of law and legal institutions in
Latin America.
This explanation, however, is assembled in some very peculiar ways. The
general description, and the constructed tradition of Latin American law it
supports, suffers from at least three different types of flaws. First, particular
problems or issues in one location are generalized and projected onto Latin
America as a whole. Conclusions are based less on detailed empirical and
contextual analyses than on overall assertions about commonalities. Thus, for
example, insufficient protection of defendant rights within the criminal
procedure of countries such as Chile or Argentina is conflated with lax law
enforcement in Colombia. In both situations, the adversarial system and oral
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hearings have been promulgated as the proper solution, propelled by the
purported, all-around superiority of development-supported “adversarialness.”
Second, units of analysis stemming from particular political or cultural
preferences in the U.S. or the North Atlantic are applied to the Latin
American context indiscriminately. The inexistence of that same political or
cultural combination in some place in Latin America is then used to show an
institutional lack or failure. For example, constitutional change through
judicial interpretation may be preferred to constitutional change through
amendments or new constitutions. It is not clear though that one is necessarily
preferable to the other. Indeed, diametrical judicial re-interpretations of
constitutional law may shake public confidence in the rule of law, especially in
populations not thoroughly imbued in liberal legal ideology. In Latin America,
constitutional change through new texts has been characterized as evidence of
constitutional failure. Another example, the lobbying of law-makers and
regulators by regulated industries may be deemed perfectly legal in the U.S.,
but ex parte communications with judges may be seen as evidence of
corruption. While in some cases the legality in the one and corruption in the
other may be clear, the difference is not universally obvious. These are just a
few very general and broad-stroke examples.
The two types of flaws, described above, can be considered problems of
insufficient context and narrow functionalism. There is another type of flaw
that is more difficult to correct. Internal critiques of liberal law, traceable to
the legal history of the West, are passed off as deficiencies specific to Latin
America. To offer just a couple of examples here, they consist of some of the
following.
First is law’s backwardness. This notion is expressed in different ways. It
is often depicted as a legal culture stuck in an earlier time, reminiscent of the
past in the West. The region’s law is seen as dominated by conceptual
formalism. The image is not unlike classical legal thought or Lochnerism in
the U.S. Additionally, the theories of a handful of European jurists are
believed to represent the whole of legal consciousness in the region. Notably,
ideas commensurate to legal realism and pragmatic legal reasoning are
believed to have not yet arrived.
Second is the gap between law and society. The gap refers to the distance
between the law practiced by ordinary people and the law on the books. This
disjuncture is deemed inordinately, and measurably, wider in Latin America
than elsewhere. It is one of the most salient images about law in the region. It
is pervasive in development writing. And, it is supported by various, presentist
works of legal history and social science. Notably, this notion is deployed by
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many different camps. For example, it is celebrated by advocates of legal
pluralism, possibly influenced by their interest in elevating the stature of
particular group law relative to the law of the state. More traditional
scholarship makes reference to this same idea in terms of the law’s lack of
penetration in society. Some progressive scholars have described it in terms of
the symbolic versus operative value of law: whereby socially responsive
legislation and constitutions are denounced as only symbolic, and not actually
effective.
Third is a culturally inappropriate European law. This element of the
diagnosis is not unrelated to the measure of the gap between law and society.
It figures as one of the explanations for the distance between the two.
Essentially, though, it is the flip side of Latin America’s historical European
legal transnationalism. The latter serves a number of functions, as noted
above, and can be seen as simply a different sort of trannational paradigm.
Within the alternate development paradigm, it becomes one of the elements
of the diagnosis of malfunction. Indeed, from this perspective, the deep
engagement in European transnationalism is one of the sources of legal failure
in the region.
Fourth is elite control of the law. This observation may express a more
radical point about liberal law in capitalist societies. It can mean that the rule
of law simply masks the true sources of power in society. In its development
version, it conjures the particular salience of a Latin American oligarchy in
control of the state. It also functions as an indictment of the sector of society
resistant, for one reason or another, to proposed legal changes. It is often
denoted as lack of “political will” by the powers-that-be. This position
conceives development reform as technical improvement, impeded by
illegitimate self-interest, lethargy or ignorance. It ignores the political and
distributional stakes inherent in existing law and in reforms. It groups
together those that may be politically or economically opposed with those
simply standing to lose ill-gotten rents. However, not in all cases is resistance
to a particular legal change exclusive to the elites, just like not all law reform
benefits the poor.
There are other elements of the development diagnosis, but these
examples suffice for my purposes here. In short, statements of the above type
are well-known critiques found in the history of jurisprudence in the United
States and in Europe. In fact, each of these has counterparts in both
traditions. In the development context, they are more often expressed in the
U.S. vernacular. For example, the backwardness of law can be traced to Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s observations about law in the U.S. in his article, The Path of
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the Law. In it, Holmes expressed the need of every generation to update its law
in its own language and in terms of its own uses. Scholars note Holmes’ role
as a precursor to legal realism and a critic of formalism. Critiques of
conceptual formalism in the U.S. were a mainstay of legal realists in the
1920’s-30’s in the United States. Realism sparked a loss of faith in logical
abstraction at the level performed by the then reigning classical legal thought.
Abstract principles were as a result no longer generally believed capable of
rendering concrete particular results in specific cases. As another example,
the gap between the law on the books and law in action is commonly
attributed to Roscoe Pound and his sociological jurisprudence. Here was yet
another attempt to unseat the mechanical or formalist jurisprudence. Gap
studies also became popular in the 1960’s by scholars of law and society. They
were a welcome accompaniment to the bold constitutional changes of the
Warren court. And so on with other elements of the diagnosis.
As already noted, these critiques or positions within jurisprudence have
their analogues in the civilian tradition. Indeed, it is an interesting question of
intellectual history to note their often contemporaneous popularity on both
sides of the Atlantic. Critics of formalism such as Rudolf von Jherring and
François Gény, to cite a couple, can be seen to express similar ideas to legal
realists and sociological jurisprudes in the U.S. Other parallels include the
French juristes inquiets critics of legal exegesis, the German Free Law
movement, sociological functionalism, and critical social theory. Some of
these jurisprudential commonalities have already been well described by
comparative scholars: others remain to be more fully explored.
Whether in U.S. legal jurisprudential terms or civilian ones, these
positions are predominantly internal arguments within modern systems of law.
Historically, they can be traced to particular political contexts with real stakes.
Over time, they can also be seen to support particular positions in contests
over legal interpretation and institutional design. In this way, they are part of
the repertoire of legal political argument, often deployed in favor of one or
another position on legal policy, positive law, legal institutions, constitutional
interpretation, and change of this sort.
Each of these may have been at one time potentially devastating attacks
on the legitimacy of the existing legal system, but for the most part they are
currently normalized features of liberal legal discourse. For example, the
common observation of elite control of law parallels a Marxist-type analysis of
the real power in society and law’s merely masking role. However, in the
development diagnosis they serve merely as arguments for much tamer policy
change and distributional reallocation. They usher in reforms consisting of
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other versions of liberal law with different positive rules, institutional design,
and historic or cultural origins. As such, the observed existence of the abovedescribed negative phenomena within the law is never fully rectified or
eliminated.
Indeed, aspects of law will always be liable to charges of needed updating
– depending on what one wants to change. Conceptual formalism is an
inherent dimension of logical reasoning: Its total elimination is impossible.
What we find logically convincing may only be phenomenologically produced.
In other words, there is no clear dividing line between formal and anti-formal,
it may be a product of shared experience varying from reference group to
reference group. The gap between law and action is axiomatically ever present.
While surely there may be some rules more closely followed than others, a full
society-wide measure is quite impossible. Resources for law enforcement
surely play a predominant role. Plus, the reasons for rule non-compliance may
be so broad ranging that even such a measure, were it possible, would be
practically meaningless.
In any case, these internal critiques comprise the diagnosis of law in
Latin America. This repertoire of legal arguments is projected as the external
description of Latin American legal systems as a whole. As such, the charge
of formalism is not simply directed at a line of conservative constitutional
opinions but rather it becomes a problem of the whole legal culture. The law
in action is not simply a way of privatizing areas of commercial law but rather
marks the irrelevance of the whole of state law. European transnationalism is
not simply a mode of legal reasoning but a mark of cultural inappositeness of
the social system that is law and its exclusivity to a racial and cultural minority
in the region. In short, the architects of development transnationalism have
projected these moves as the diagnosis. This rendering promotes law reform
and institutional re-design. Projects are, in this way, more easily sold. Absent a
functioning law, replacement or substitution appears not only desirable but
necessary.
Over time, these particular explanations and diagnoses buttressing
particular projects of law reform or funding assistance have consolidated a
standing narrative about law in Latin America. The amalgamation of these
mutually-reinforcing descriptions has the effect of casting law in the region as
effectively incapable of performing the functions expected of law. These
enduring views have ripened into an identity or, in effect, a tradition of law.
This instrumentalized image has solidified into the common understanding of
the workings of law in the region. However, the shortcomings identified and
the failings decried paint a permanent picture of failure. As noted above, the
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elements of this diagnosis cannot be reversed through simple law reform.
They are constantly observable features of liberal legal systems. Moreover,
these internal critiques passing as diagnosis – while no doubt insights of
jurisprudence on the workings and assumptions of liberal legalism – are
routine tactical moves within legal politics. They are available to advance
endless proposals. Thus, as failings of the legal system to be rectified and
fixed, success is never achievable. Their endogeneity to liberal law is what
makes them continually available as justifications for new reforms.
Troublingly, as a significant dynamic for law reform in Latin America, it
seriously debilitates and undermines law, generally, as a social system.
Pursuing reform in this way is counter-productive. First, it undermines the
legal system purportedly “assisted” by continually denigrating it for the
purpose of ushering in reforms. The reforms are equally liberal legal forms
subject to the same failings previously diagnosed. Second, it occludes
potential alternatives and values in pre-reform law not openly evaluated. An
example is the mix of defendants’ rights and state enforcement powers in the
areas of criminal procedure. The detailed question of specific rights at
different stages of the proceedings and the appropriate mix in particular
countries take a back seat to the juggernaut of transforming procedure from
the traditional inquisitorial to the development adversarial. This example
particularly shows the impact of the widely reviled “inquisitorial” model linked
to Latin America, branded the cause of evils ranging from human rights
abuses to non-enforcement, impunity, secrecy, corruption, undemocratic-ness
and the like. However, the mere substitution of inquisitorial to adversarial
obscures the many detailed policy questions that re-calibrating criminal
procedure entails. More “orality” and shifting discretion from the judge of
instruction to the public prosecutor will not solve the intrinsic tensions
between political independence and official accountability, defendant rights
versus state enforcement powers, positive law and social behavior.
In short, legal and institutional reform under the umbrella of
development transnationalism undermines a significant amount of potential
legal capital, or acquis légaux. Many legal policies and institutional forms may be
easily if not automatically rejected through this formula. In this short Essay, it
is not possible to discuss the array of legal capital existing within legal systems
in Latin America. Briefly, though, they consist in part of the accumulated
social investment in law and legal institutions over time, such as training the
legal profession in certain modes of procedure and discourses of
argumentation. A switch to different processes with different discursive
landmarks and constraints adds significant costs. However, without a clear
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definition of the policy changes and distributional consequences sought, a
different legal institutional model may not fare any better. Indeed, as a result
of the limitations of liberal law noted above, the same failure will likely reappear.
Additionally, the acquis légaux also include particular political positions or
policy combinations enshrined in law that, as a result of the development
formula for reform, are never openly considered as real alternatives. It may be
that a current policy mix can be convincingly shown to be counter-productive
to economic development, but then again the reform may simply be more
beneficial to those effectively mobilizing a “development” argument. For
example, the position to reduce pro-labor legislation in Latin American
countries draws strongly on the characterization of general legal failure.
Specifically cited are the lack of enforcement, limited coverage, and
cooptation of unions by government in some cases. In other words, the
diagnosis is the same: lawlessness, the gap between law on the books and law
in action, and official corruption. Discrediting national law assists in making
the case for reforms. More concretely, however, real questions of policy over
job security, workers’ rights, medical benefits, and the like are at play.
Moreover, such reforms begin to shape the national political economy. Much
of this discussion and debate, however, is waged only indirectly. It is obscured
by the logic of development transnationalism. Rather than confront the stakes
more directly, attention is directed to rectify purportedly broken legal systems,
when at issue are policy changes and distributional re-allocations.
V. INTER-DISCIPLINARY SUPPORT FOR THE TRADITION
The development diagnosis is also supported by inter-disciplinary work.
The main examples come from legal history, comparative politics, and legal
sociology. In this section, though, I will draw from an example from finance
studies. Briefly, the “legal origins” literature recently developed in the area of
law and finance is another example of failed law discourse. The source is a
series of empirical works by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. The authors claim a significant corelation in levels of national economic development, measured by breadth of
share ownership and depth of capital markets, to the legal origins of key
corporate law rules. To do this, they divide countries into categories based on
the origin of four primary legal systems: English, French, German and
Scandinavian. They show through statistical regression that countries whose
relevant business law originates in France fare far worse than any other group
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of countries. The common law countries perform the best. The authors admit
that France and Belgium, notwithstandingly, are developed countries. (You
can’t argue with success.) Other than a few other also developed European
countries -- like the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain --- most
other French-origin countries are in fact Latin American states.
I highlight this school of scholarship, and work of this type, to note the
overall impact of studies like this. This type of literature contributes to the
overall diagnosis of a failed law in Latin America. It is not dependent on
development expert reports for its conclusions. Rather, the common sense
understanding of experts, law firms, government agencies, and professors of
law are formed and buttressed by social science and other academic work of
this nature. This type of study, however, is highly questionable. Numerous
critiques of the “legal origins” theses are already published. To note a few,
Detlev Vagts notes that legal comparativists have long shown these groupings
of legal families do not withstand scrutiny. Mathias Siems argues that “legal
families” culled from generic comparative law texts is too imprecise a variable
for econometric measures. Moreover, Siems notes: “the fact that in most law
and finance studies the French legal family performs worst is mainly a
statement about Latin America.” Mark Roe shows that differences of political
economy, including devastation by war and government policy, are better
explanations of differential economic performance. Mark West notes the
possibility of statistically significant regressions of legal origins with something
as outlandish as world cup victories – in which case French legal origin is
fantastic. West provocatively makes the point that a-contextual regression
analyses can lead to quite non-sensical results. Daniel Berkowitz, Katherina
Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, in a rather more internal critique, note the
significant difference in home-grown origins versus transplanted-law origins.
In short, despite its serious flaws, scholarship of this type contributes to
the construction of Latin America’s tradition of law. This scholarship can be
particularly easily instrumentalized in the service of development
transnationalism. It supports the general diagnosis of law in the region. In this
way, it can bolster country reports and project proposals in individual areas. It
is not that I am claiming a conspiracy of the social sciences in reaching
conclusions concordant with the overall paradigm of international relations in
the legal sphere. However, scholars may be drawn to these research designs
and feel comfortable with their overall conclusions because they appear to be
common sense. Clearly, there have been greater levels of economic
development in the United States than in Latin America. Statistically corelating legal system origins to that fact, however, tells us nothing about the
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political and social context. It does, however, solidify an image of law and
legal families as a set of competing models. Within that competition, the Latin
American version is again presented as failed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paradigm of development transnationalism in Latin America
promotes the construction of a tradition of Latin American law. Rather than a
positive source, this tradition is the characterization of pre-reform law against
which development reforms are to be undertaken. Such tradition is produced
by analyses and diagnoses of law’s failure to deliver development and
democracy to the region. It is bolstered by works of legal history, comparative
politics, and legal sociology drawn to this same problematic. Often reading the
same diagnosis back into the history of Latin American states, or finding the
same failings in every social sector of national societies, inter-disciplinary
scholars frequently reinforce the same conclusions. Specifically, law in Latin
America is faulted for the intrinsic limitations of liberal law as a system of
social governance. In this way, the failure described is permanent. It is
inherent in all modern legal systems to some degree.
Viewed, then, as an instrumental characterization, the Latin American
legal tradition of legal failure serves to promote projects of legal change and
reform. While the projects advanced may have different political valences –
including some with which we might agree – my argument here is that reform
pursued in this way is counterproductive and undermines the standing of law
in the region. Furthermore, it obfuscates the real questions underlying legal
reform and the actual impact that these changes bring. Under cover of a
substitution to a more developed law, the rule of law, best practices, or what
have you, a different set of policies and institutional arrangements are put in
place. While this has the effect of changing course, it is less clear that the
policies previously in place have been convincingly shown wrong or lack
majority support. Moreover, some political positions worth defending may be
more easily swept away through the fiction of pursuing policy and
distributional change as simply a matter of correcting for a failed law.
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